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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm’s performance on 
listed conventional banking companies at Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). Based on existing empirical 
studies, five key attributes of corporate governance (board size, the proportion of independent 
directors on board, the proportion of female directors on board, institutional ownership and size of 
audit committee) have been selected to identify their influence on firm’s financial performance. 
Tobin’s Q (a market-based performance measure) and Return on Asset- ROA (an accounting based 
performance measure) consider as financial performance measures. Using OLS as a method of 
estimation, the results provide evidence of a significant negative relationship between the 
performance of the firm and the proportion of independent directors on board as well as size of the 
audit committee. The result also provides evidence of a significant negative relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and institutional ownership but a positive and insignificant between ROA and 
institutional ownership. Furthermore, there is a negative relationship between the proportion of 
female directors in board and the performance of the firm but is not significant. Board size as 
predictor variable is negative and insignificant with Tobin’s Q. 
 
JEL Classifications: G 21, G 34 
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INTRODUCTION 
The primary goal of a firm is to maximize the wealth of 
the shareholders. The wealth is created by a firm through 
its actions and decisions as reflected on its market value. 
The market value of the firm shares is the reflection of 
shareholders’ perception of the quality of its financial 
decisions and performance. Therefore managers’ actions 
and decisions should lead to shareholders’ wealth 
maximization. In agency theory, explained the agency 
relationship arises when one or more persons (the 
principal) employs another person (agent) to provide a 
service and then the principal delegates decision-making 
authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). But 
for various reasons (i.e. personal self-interest, separation 
of ownership from management and asymmetry of 
information between agent and principal) the agent may 
act for his or her interest even if it is against in the 
interest of the principal. Berlee and Means (1934) 
generalized this behavior as that leading to agency cost. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) study provided that 
executives try to maximize their self-interest from the 
shareholder resources. Therefore a control mechanism is 
needed to mitigate this opportunistic behavior. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that the agency problem can 
be solved through management compensation and 
implementation of good governance. Corporate 
governance is the widest control to mitigate agency cost 
and improve firm’s efficiency. In 1999 the OECD issued a 
document, The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
that emphasizes that corporations should be run best and 
foremost, in the interests of shareholders (OECD 1999). 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships 
between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which 
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined.” (OECD Principles of Corporate 
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Governance, 2nd Edition, 2004). Corporate governance 
covers the concepts, theories, and practices of boards and 
their directors and the relationship between boards and 
shareholders, top management, regulators and auditors and 
other stakeholders (Huq & Bhuiyan, 2012). Some empirical 
investigations found that good corporate governance has a 
positive effect on firm’s performance and market value 
(Sami, Wang, & Zhou, 2011). Chowdhury (2004) showed a 
positive relationship between good corporate governance 
and market competitiveness and performance. Board 
performance of its monitoring duties usually is influenced 
by the effectiveness of the board, which in turn is influenced 
by factors such as board composition and quality, size of 
boards, the duality of CEO/Chairman positions, board 
diversity and ownership, information asymmetries and 
board culture (Brennan, 2006). 
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The aim of this research is to examine the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of 
conventional banking companies listed in Dhaka Stock 
Exchange of Bangladesh. To achieve this aim, research 
objectives for the study are to examine the pattern of board 
structure in conventional banking companies of Bangladesh 
and to examine whether the different patterns of board 
structure and shareholdings have any influence on their 
performance. Therefore, the study extends and contributes 
to the body of research using data collected from annual 
report of selected banking companies listed in Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. The outcome will be further helpful to the 
decision makers of this industry as this sector was rarely 
explored earlier on this regard. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In our country, Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission (BSEC), the regulatory authority, firstly, 
introduced corporate governance guideline in 2006 and 
later revised in 2012 to ensure proper monitoring and 
governance of the firms. All listed companies have to 
prepare the corporate governance compliance checklist 
since 2006. Before implementation of the guideline of 
corporate governance (amendment) 2012, only a few 
listed companies disclose the corporate governance 
information in details voluntarily. 
Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), also using the 
Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) database, 
distinguish between governance attributes that are 
legally required and attributes that are adopted 
voluntarily. They show that firms that voluntarily adopt 
a more rigorous corporate governance structure are 
rewarded with a higher firm value. Aggarwal and 
Williamson (2006) and Brown and Caylor (2006) also use 
the ISS database to construct governance indices for U.S. 
firms only, and both find a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and firm value.Abbasi et al. (2102) 
using the food industry of companies listed on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2011, found strong 
and positive impact on corporate governance (focused on 
four aspects namely Ownership Concentration, 
Institutional Ownership, Chief Executive Officer duality 
and Board’s Independence) on firm’s value measured 
through Tobin’s Q.  Rouf (2012) examined the 
relationship between four corporate governance 
mechanisms (board size, independent director on board, 
chief executive officer duality and board audit 
committee) and value of the firm (performance) 
measures (return on assets, ROA and return on equity, 
ROE) based on a sample of 93 listed nonfinancial 
companies in Dhaka Stock Exchanges (DSE) 2006 and  
found a positive significant relationship between ROA 
and board independent director as well as chief 
executive however, but could not provide a significant 
relationship between the value of the firm measures 
(ROA and ROE) and board size and board audit 
committee. Dung To Thi (2011) investigated the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm 
value by using information taken from of Vietnamese 
Listed Companies on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
(HOSE) and Ha Noi Stock Exchange (HNX) at the year-
end 2009. The empirical findings show that the dual 
position of CEO and Chairman has a positive 
relationship with firm value. Besides, the age of director 
and the number of directors meeting play important 
roles in firm value. However, no significant impact of 
board size, board gender diversity, top ten shareholders 
concentration and levels of state ownership on firm 
performance. Lastly, the regression model of market 
performance shows that the duality of CEO and 
Chairman and the number of independent directors are 
the significant impact on firm value. Khurram Khan et 
al., (2011) investigate the effect of corporate governance 
on firm’s performance of the Tobacco Industry of 
Pakistan using data from 2004 to 2008 using multiple 
regression statistical technique to measure the 
relationships between dependent and independent 
variables. Ownership concentration, CEO duality & 
Board’s Independence are independent variables. The 
results show that there is a strong and positive impact of 
the corporate governance on firm’s performance, 
Therefore, effective corporate governance mechanisms 
(including board composition and ownership structures) 
are important for creating value addition of the firm.  
Swastika (2013), using data from the years 2005 annual 
reports of 51 food and beverage companies in Indonesia, 
showed that two of the corporate governance variables, the 
board of directors and audit quality, as well as firm size,  are 
statistically significant in explaining earning management 
measured by discretionary accruals. Ozkan (2007) stated 
that corporate governance mechanisms such as board 
composition and ownership structures have the influence 
on compensation policy and reduce the agency conflicts 
between executives and shareholders.  
Black (2001) studies a small sample of 21 firms in 1999, 
with very limited control variables, but reports a strong 
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correlation between a corporate governance index and 
the market value of Russian firms. 
Further study by Black et al. (2005), using time-series 
evidence from Russia for 1999-2004, found an 
economically important and statistically strong 
correlation between governance and market value in 
OLS with firm clusters and in firm random effects and 
firm fixed effects regressions. 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Based on a literature review as well as some previous 
studies, the researchers indicated that proxy GCG 
mechanism through board size, independent board, 
female directors, institutional ownership, and audit 
committees as independent variables while the 
performance of the company as the dependent variable. 
To help understand the impact corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm’s performance required a 
framework of thought. Of the basic theory outlined 
above, it can be described in a theoretical framework that 
is structured as follows: 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
In family-controlled business in developing countries 
like Bangladesh, Board size is one of the major corporate 
governance mechanisms. It is determined on the basis of 
how much it influences the communication & 
coordination and control management of a firm (Saha & 
Akter, 2013). While large board size is considered fruitful 
for firms to secure its valuable resources and to reduce 
uncertainties (Goodstein, Gautum, & Boeker, 1994; 
Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 1983; Uadiale, 2010) some 
other found potential problems within. But small board 
size is generally believed to improve the firm by 
maintaining proper coordination and communication 
and by reducing the possibility of free riding. Many 
empirical studies were found an insignificant 
relationship between board size and firm value (Rouf, 
2012; Dung To Thi,2011; Mak and Kusandi, 2005; Sanda 
et al. 2005). I assume the hypothesis below: 
H1: The size of the board is positively related to the 
performance of the firm. 
In Cadbury report (1992), there should be an effective 
composition of the board of directors to maintain their 
vitality. Beassley (1996) stated that the presence of 
independent directors on the board composition could 
reduce fraudulent financial reporting that increase the value 
of the company. In Sarbanes Oxley Act (2012) emphasizes 
the inclusion of independent directors. The proportion of 
independent directors is positively correlated with the value 
of the firm (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Rouf, 2012; 
Khurram Khan et al., 2011; Mukhtaruddin et al., 2014). But 
the relationship between independent directors and the 
firm value was negative (Klein,1998; Yermark,1996). I 
assume the hypothesis below: 
H2: Independent directors have positively related to the 
performance of the firm. 
Earlier empirical research rarely focused on the presence 
of female directors on the board. 
Robinson and Dechant (1997) stated that female directors 
are hard workers and have good communication skills with 
problem-solving and decision-making capacity in the entire 
board. Eagly and Carli (2003) find that females reach to 
directorship position and demonstrate that they are highly 
proficient, diligent, and sincere about responsibilities and 
take the best preparation before the board meeting and 
improve board effectiveness. Carter et al., (2003) finds a 
positive relation between percentage of female directors 
and firm performance. But Dung To Thi (2011) was found 
no significant impact of board gender diversity on firm 
performance.  I assume the hypothesis below: 
H3: Female directors have positively related to the 
performance of the firm. 
Institutional ownership has one of the important roles in 
reducing the agency problem that occurred. Institutional 
ownership acts as the controlling party and corporate 
managers. The greater the level of stock ownership by 
institutions, then the control mechanisms on 
performance management will be more effective. The 
level of institutional ownership in a substantial 
proportion will affect the market value of the firm 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Widanar, 2009). 
Previous studies were found the positive relation between 
institutional ownership and firm value (McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Abbasi et al. 2102; Mukhtaruddin et al., 2014). 
But Loderer and Martin (1997) find no significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance. I assume the hypothesis below: 
H4: Institutional ownership has positively related to the 
performance of the firm. 
The role of the audit committee is essential in implementing 
corporate governance principles and improving the value of 
the firm. In case of any financial manipulation, the audit 
committee is held accountable for their actions as the 
availability of transparent financial information reduces the 
information asymmetry and improves the value of the firm 
(Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). Mukhtaruddin et al., 2014 found 
that audit committee has a positive and insignificant 
influence towards firm value. But Rouf (2012) could not 
provide a significant relationship between the values of the 
firm measures and board audit committee. I assume the 
hypothesis below: 
H5: Audit committee has positively related to the 
performance of the firm. 
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RESEARCH METHOD  
Sample Selection 
After the independence, the banking industry in 
Bangladesh started its journey with six nationalized 
commercialized banks, two state-owned specialized 
banks and three foreign banks. In the 1980’s banking 
industry achieved a significant expansion with the 
entrance of private banks. At present, there are fifty six 
scheduled banks in Bangladesh which operate under full 
control and supervision of Bangladesh Bank. The 
financial sector of Bangladesh is dominated by banks and 
the share of this sector in the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is 2.87% for the fiscal year 2014-15 (Bangladesh 
Economic Review 2015). Furthermore, during the last ten 
years, the total asset of the banking sector has grown 
rapidly which is the sign of the remarkable contribution 
of the banking sector in the development of the country 
(Ali et al., 2016).  
The population of my study is twenty-three listed 
conventional banks in Dhaka Stock Exchange.  
Therefore, fourteen banks are selecting as a sample of my 
study. Name of banks are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Sample Bank listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange 
1.  AB Bank Ltd. 
2. Bank Asia Ltd.  
3. BRAC Bank Ltd.  
4. The City Bank Ltd. 
5. Dutch-Bangla Bank Ltd. 
6. Eastern Bank Ltd. 
7. IFIC Bank Ltd. 
8. Mercantile Bank Ltd. 
9. National Credit and Commerce Bank Ltd.  
10. Prime Bank Ltd. 
11. Pubali Bank Ltd. 
12. Trust Bank Ltd. 
13. United Commercial Bank Ltd. 
14. Uttara Bank Limited  
Data Collection Method 
Secondary data from the annual reports of the sample 
banks for the years 2007 to 2016 used to complete this 
work. The end-of-year number of shares outstanding and 
end-of-year share price from Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(DSE) and annual reports have been used to calculate the 
market value of equity. 
Measurement of Variables 
Firm’s performance is dependent variable measured by 
Return on Assets (ROA) (an accounting based 
performance measure)-calculated as “Profit after tax” 
(PAT) scaled by the average of total assets and another 
one is Tobin’s Q-the ratio of the market value of the firm 
to total shareholders’ equity of the firm (a market-based 
performance measure). Tobin's Q is sometimes written as 
"Tobin's-q", "Tobin's Q" or simply Q. It is also called 
Tobin's Quotient since the Q stands for Quotient. 
Sometimes, people call it the "Brainard-Tobin Q”.  The 
market value of the firm is calculated by multiplying 
market value per share to a total number of shares 
outstanding. Board size, Independent board, Female 
directors, Institutional ownership, and Audit committees 
are proxies of Corporate Governance Mechanisms and 
also considered as independent variables. 
Table 2: Independent variables and their measurement 
in this study 
Board size The number of board members 
(Suranta and Machfoedz, 2003). 
Independent 
board 
The proportion of independent 
director on the board.  
Female director The proportion of female director on 
the board. (Rahaman,2016) 
Institutional 
ownership 
The proportion of shares held by the 
institution (s).  
Audit Committee The number of members in audit 
committee. (Mukhtaruddin et al.2014) 
Model Specification 
In order to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance, the 
following model is developed: 
Yi,t  = α + β1 BODSZ i,t  + β2 ID i,t  + β3 FD i,t  + β4 IO i,t  
+ β5AC i,t+ ε   
Where, 
Y i, is alternatively ROAi, and Tobin’s Qi, 
BODSZ i, is the size of the board for ith firm at time t, 
ID i, is the proportion of independent director on the 
board for ith firm at time t, 
FD i, is the proportion of female director on the board for 
ith firm at time t, 
IO i, is the proportion of shares held by the institution (s) 
for ith firm at time t, 
AC i, is the number of members in audit committee for 
ith firm at time t, 
α is the intercept, βi is the regression coefficient and ε is 
the error term, 
The subscript i represents the different firms and t 
represents the different years. 
EMPIRICAL RESULT ANALYSIS 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TOBQ 0.2292 13.3857 2.0472 1.8316 
BODSZ 5 27 13.35 4.3740 
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ID 0.0000 0.6000 0.1278 0.1212 
FD 0.0000 0.5000 0.1259 0.1127 
IO 0.0000 0.6482 0.2002 0.1466 
AC 0 5 3.81 0.9440 
ROA 0.0019 0.0352 0.0140 0.0065 
To test the propositions made in this study, this section is 
devoted to present the result of the analysis conducted 
on collected data. Data has been analyzed using the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences; (SPSS Version 
15.0).The descriptive statistics of all the variables used in 
the study are shown in table 3. As shown in the table, 
average firm performance is 204.72% ranging from 
22.92% to 1338.57% under Tobin’s Q performance 
measure and 1.40% ranging from 0.19% to 3.52% under 
the ROA performance measure. It indicates that for every 
BDT 100 invested as an asset there is a return of BDT 
1.40. The average board size is found to be 13 directors 
ranging from 5 to 27. The result indicates that 12.78% 
directors acting as independent sitting on the board 
ranging from 0% to 60% for selected firms of the study. 
On the other hand, there are 12.59% female directors 
sitting on the board ranging from 0% to 50%. 
Shareholding position by institutions is presented 20.02% 
ranging from 0% to 64.82%. The average member of the 
audit committee is 4 ranging from 0 to 5. 
Table 4: Correlation coefficient among variables 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
To measure the strength of association among the 
variables, Pearson correlation analysis is conducted on 
the variables. The results are shown in Table 4. Tobin’s Q 
is negatively correlated to board size, the proportion of 
independent directors, the proportion of female 
directors, institutional ownership and the number of 
member in audit committee. The negative correlation of 
Tobin’s Q with the proportion of independent directors, 
institutional ownership and the number of member in 
audit committee is significant at the level of 0.01. 
Similarly the negative correlation of Tobin’s Q with the 
proportion of female directors is significant at the level of 
0.05 and with board size is not significant. On the other 
hand, beside a negative correlation with Tobin’s Q, ROA 
is positively correlated with board size and significant at 
the level of 0.05.  Moreover ROA is negatively correlated 
to the proportion of independent directors, the 
proportion of female directors, institutional ownership 
and the number of member in audit committee. The 
negative correlation of ROA with the proportion of 
independent directors and the number of member in 
audit committee is significant at the level of 0.01. But the 
negative relationship of ROA with the proportion of 
female directors and institutional ownership is 
insignificant. 
Table 5. Regression Analysis (Tobin’s Q as dependent 
variable) 
 
 
 
 
  
Das: Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Firm’s Performance: A Study on Listed Conventional Banks                                                                                                           (15-24) 
Page 20                                                                                                                                                             Asian Business Review ● Volume 7 ●Number 1/2017 
Table 6: Regression Analysis (ROA as dependent variable) 
 
 
 
Table 5 and Table 6 show the results of the coefficient 
estimates with both Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent 
variable. Besides, the table also shows the model summary 
of regression analysis with adjusted R square measure and 
F statistics value. The adjusted R square value, indicating 
the explanatory power of the independent variables, is 
0.206 and 0.197 respectively for Tobin’s Q and ROA. It 
indicates that 20.60% of the variation in Tobin’s Q and 
19.70% of the variation in ROA is explained by the 
variation in the independent variables. 
From the result of the analysis, the analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) generates a significant 0.000 for Tobin’s Q and 
ROA and indicating model is significant at the level of 
0.01. This shows that the explanatory variables are 
linearly related to both measures of firm’s performance 
and the model seems to have some validity. 
From Table 5, Tobin’s Q as dependent variable is negatively 
associated with other independent variables (e.g. board size, 
the proportion of independent directors on board, the 
proportion of female directors in board, institutional ownership 
and the number of member of audit committee) but significant 
with the proportion of independent directors on board and 
Institution ownership at the level of 0.05 as well as with size of 
audit committee at level of 0.01 and insignificant with the 
proportion of female directors on board as well as board size.  
On the other hand ROA as dependent variable is 
negatively associated with the proportion of independent 
directors on board, the proportion of female directors on 
board and the number of member in audit committee but 
significant with the proportion of independent directors 
on board as well as size of audit committee at level of 
0.01 and insignificant with the proportion of female 
directors on board. But ROA as the dependent variable is 
positively associated with institutional ownership but 
insignificant. Board size as the independent variable is 
not related to ROA as the dependent variable. 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study is to empirically examine the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm’s performance on 
listed conventional banking companies at Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. Based on previous empirical studies of this nature, 
a number of variables have been identified that to explain the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm’s 
performance. Collected data on these variables including 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, Board size, and the proportion of 
independent directors on board, the proportion of female 
directors on the board, institutional ownership and the size of 
the audit committee are thus analyzed to test the hypothesis 
proposed in the study. Results generated from the data 
analysis show that the performance of the firm is negatively 
correlated with independent directors on board as well as the 
size of the audit committee and significant at the level of 0.01. 
The proportion of independent directors on board and size of 
the audit committee as independent variables is significant 
negative with the performance of the firm. The negative 
relation between Tobin’s Q and Independent directors in the 
board is significant at the level 0.05. The negative association 
between Tobin’s Q and size of the audit committee is 
significant at the level 0.01. The negative relationship of ROA 
with independent directors on the board as well as the size of 
the audit committee is significant at level 0.01.Independent 
directors may not able to increase the performance of listed 
banking companies in Dhaka Stock Exchange as the role of 
independent directors is hardly independent. The effective 
performance of independent directors is contingent on varies 
issues mainly expertise, independent from internal 
management and financial transaction with the organization. 
Moreover, the proportion of independent directors on the 
board is small enough to play their strong monitoring role on 
the board. Audit committee should be given a level playing 
field in making decisions for effective and efficient operations 
of the company and included majority portion of independent 
directors. Institutional ownership and the proportion of 
female directors on the board are negatively correlated with 
the performance of the firm. But this relationship is significant 
only market-based performance measure (Tobin’s Q). In 
Bangladesh, Investment Corporation of Bangladesh (ICB) is 
the main institutional shareholder and they could not 
nominate in each company because of the shortage of 
manpower and right expertise. Furthermore, this study may 
be improved by including more companies and some other 
variables that may affect corporate financial performance. 
This study could be further extended to other industry. 
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